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1Wages Anatomy. 
Labor supply of nurses and a comparison with physicians. 
Leif Andreassen1, Maria Laura Di Tommaso2 and Steinar Strøm3
Abstract 
We estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of Registered Nurses’ labor supply with 
random terms. A distinguished feature of our model is that random terms are correlated over time 
and jobs (habit persistence). Past options and not only the past optimal choices matter for the 
current choices. Given observed incentives, we find that nurses are mobile when they are young 
(less than physicians), but there is also a weak tendency of higher mobility again when they are 
approaching retirement age. Wage increases have a modest impact on labor supply. The overall 
elasticity for nurses is close to zero (like for physicians). These low elasticities shadow for stronger 
responses, shifting labor away from part time jobs in the public and private sector towards full time 
jobs in the private sector. A change in taxation away from the progressive tax system towards a flat 
tax of 28% gives Registered Nurses a very modest incentive to shift their job to private hospitals. 
For physicians the impact is stronger. 
JEL classifications: J22, I10, C35 
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21. Introduction
The main motivation for the paper is that, as is the case with other OECD countries, Norway’s 
population is ageing and the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of the population aged 65 and 
over to the population aged 20-64 is estimated to nearly double: from 32.7% in 2011 to 62.2% in 
20504 (OECD, 2013). This phenomenon implies that in the coming decades there will be many old 
people requiring care in hospitals and elderly homes (OECD 2005). There will thus be a growing 
demand for nurses and medical doctors. This increase in demand can be covered with more nurses 
and medical doctors educated at Norwegian universities or migrating from abroad. The latter might 
be a difficult option, since most other OECD countries have the same need for people working in 
the health sector (OECD 2103). 
In this paper, we focus on another option. We study how nurses respond to incentives to work 
longer hours and we compare them with medical doctors. Almost 50% of Norwegian nurses work 
part time and their working hours are among the lowest in the European Union (see OECD 2005). 
There might be room for increasing labor supply of nurses. Specifically, we wish to understand to 
what degree  wages and  taxes  affect the  labor supply of  nurses. We  do  this by  estimating a 
longitudinal discrete choice model on panel data for Registered Nurses. Andreassen et al. (2013) 
estimate a longitudinal discrete choice model on panel data for physicians. The contribution of this 
paper is to estimate the same model for nurses and to compare the results for nurses with the results 
for physicians published in Andreassen et al. (2013). The available choices for nurses are different 
types of working loads in primary care and hospitals. In the model, we allow for taste or habit 
persistence that may slow down mobility across jobs and working loads when wages and taxes are 
changed to stimulate labor supply. The period of estimation is 1997 to 1999. 
The main conclusion is that by cutting taxes and/or increasing wages nurses both start 
working and move to jobs with higher working loads. However, the impact is not strong. Wage 
increases have the greatest effect on labor supply among nurses aged 35-50, while less progressive 
taxes stimulates in particular medical doctors to move to jobs with higher working loads in the 
private sector. It should be noted that the impact of a wage increase on labour supply is in part 
absorbed by taxation. Because all details of a step-wise linear progressive tax system is accounted 
for when estimating the model, this absorption is explicitly taken into account. As mentioned 
4 This is in line with the average rise for the OECD area as a whole, although the increase in Norway is less dramatic 
than projected in most EU countries. In the EU21 countries, the ratio is projected to increase from 37.1% in 2011 to 
76.1% in 2050. 
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 
above, a novel feature of the model is the estimate of habit persistence. We find that young nurses 
(like young medical doctors) have less habit persistence than the older ones. 
Moreover we find that the preferences are rather similar for nurses and physicians, with the 
exception that the number of small children has a significant negative impact on labor supply for 
nurses, but not for physicians. Most of the physicians are males while almost all nurses are females. 
Another important finding is that the overall elasticities are close to zero and very similar to the 
ones for medical doctors. 
Di Tommaso et al. (2009) estimate on the same data a static discrete choice model of labor 
supply on nurses. The estimates indicate that overall labor supply is rather inelastic with an average 
elasticity of 0.33. The results is similar to the results reported in Shields (2004). This paper shows, 
based on the longitudinal approach and with habit persistence, that the labor supply of nurses 
becomes even more inelastic. 
In the next section we give a brief but self-contained review of the model. Data is presented in 






The model we use in this section is similar to the model estimated for physicians by 
Andreassen et al (2013) so that it is possible to show similarities and differences between nurses 
and physicians. 
The model we employ allows for habit persistence and therefore correlation in utilities across 
time. Let Ujn(t) be the utility of nurse n when working in job type j at time t. The utility function is 
assumed to be random because there are job attributes that affect preferences that we do not 
observe. Let vjn(t) be the systematic part of the utility function and let ɛjn(t) be the random taste 
shifter, assumed to be independent and identical extreme value distributed. Following Dagsvik 




(1) U jn( t ) maxj  U jn( t -1)- ,v jn( t )jn( t )
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The coefficient ρ is a preference discount factor. If ρ =0 there is a complete strong taste or habit 
persistence, and if ρ =∞ there is no taste persistence at all andU jn( t ) vjn( t )jn( t ) . The inclusion 
of taste or habit persistence is a behavioural assumption and it implies that individuals' past options 
(and not only past optimal choices) matter for current choices. This implies that the current choice 
depends on all the utility functions associated with each alternative in the past, not only the optimal 
one. If ρ =∞, the model degenerates to a standard multinomial logit model that can be estimated on 
panel data, see Train (2003). If ρ =0, then utilities are perfectly correlated across time. 
From the model we can derive transition probabilities, which will be estimated on panel 
data. We will assume that nurse n will choose the state that maximizes utility, given his or her 
choice set. Nurses can choose between 10 states, which vary with respect to type of institution 
(hospitals versus primary care), sector (public versus private) and hours offered by the institutions 
in the health care sector (part time versus full time). Part time is defined as a number of hours of 
work less than 30. We will assume that the choice set is related to availability of jobs, characterized 
by offered hours. Thus, in our model the nurses are not free to choose any hours they like to work. 
We will assume that 
 
( 2a) gjnt( hj nt ) exp( d1 j zj nt ); zjnt  1if hj nt  30;0 otherwise,( part time) 
( 2b) gjnt( hjnt ) exp( d2 j zj nt ); zjnt  1if either hj nt  30;0 otherwise,( full time ) 
 
Note that the g(.) function captures the rationing of full time jobs and dkj are parameters to be 
estimated for each sector j and working loads k. The g(.) function capture the availability of full 
time and part hours in the different jobs.5 For physicians there are only a rationing of full time jobs 
while for nurses there is a rationing of part time as well as full time jobs. 
 
Let Qijnt denote the probability that doctor or nurse n moves from state i  in period t-1 to state j 
in period t, and Qiint denotes the probability that doctor or nurse n stays in state i also in period t. 
 
With the assumed probability distribution for jnt , we get (Dagsvik (2002): 
 
Q  Vjnt ;  i, j 0,1,2,...,9 ijnt t     9 exp( ( t r ))Vknr 
(3) r t0 
9 
k 0 












The different job types that the employed nurse can choose between are: 
0 = not working 
1 = working part time in a hospital in the private sector; 
2 = working full time in a hospital in the private sector; 
3 = working part time in primary care in the private sector; 
4 = working full time in primary care in the private sector; 
5 = working part time in a hospital in the public sector; 
6 = working full time in a hospital in the public sector; 
 
7 = working part time in primary care in the public sector; 
8 = working full time in primary care in the public sector; 
9= working in other sectors6. 
2.1 The deterministic part of the utility function 
We will assume that the systematic or deterministic part of the utility function is given by: 
 
 





















bs Xsnt ) 
( Ljnt L )1 


Here Cjnt is disposable annual income, and it is given by 
(5)Cjnt= ft(wjnthjnt+SInt)+Int, 
wjnt is the hourly wage rate, hjnt denotes annual hours of work, SInt is the wage income from 
secondary jobs and Int is non-labor income, including the after-tax income of a spouse, child 
benefits and other benefits. The functional form of ft(.) depends on the characteristics of the tax 




6 The classification of sectors is based on the standard used by Statistics Norway, which is based on the statistical 
Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) used in the European Community. The sector “Other sectors” consists of 
all types of jobs that do not fall in under either hospital or health care services. It thereby includes nurses doing a wide 
variety of work outside the traditional health care sectors, such as administrative work in government and in the private 
sector. 
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Annual leisure is denoted Ljnt. We assume 12 hours a day for rest and sleep and 48 weeks of 
work a year. Therefore, leisure in this definition is equal to the total number of hours in a year 
(8760) minus sleeping time in a year minus hours of work. Leisure includes therefore hours in the 














Moreover X1nt is age and X2nt is age squared. We account for the possibility that there is an 
impact on hours supplied when spouses are working in jobs where shift work is very common like 
in the health sector. We have thus included a dummy variable X3nt which equals 1 if the nurse is 
married to a person in the health sector, and equal 0 otherwise. Other observed covariates that are 
included to account for observed heterogeneity are the dummy variables X4nt that equals 1 if more 
than one job, and equal to 0 otherwise; X5nt equals 1 if number of children 6; and X6nt equals 1 if 
number of children {>6,11}and finally X7nt equals 1 if female, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
To account for the possibility that habit persistence may increase with age (a lower preference 
discount parameter) we let the preference discount parameter  depend on the age and age squared 




( 7 ) n  0 1 X1n 2 X 2n 
 
To estimate the model we need estimates of the wage equation. How this is done and how the 






The data used in this study are the result of merging register data from Statistics Norway with 
data on physicians and nurses collected by The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional 




7   The PAI register consists of data on workers in public enterprises, including physicians and nurses working in 
hospitals and health care. 
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demographic, educational, income and labor market data. The income data is taken from tax 
returns, while the labor market data consist of employee data merged with data on employers. 
 
The resulting panel data set covers all employed registered nurses in Norway in the period 
1997 – 1999. Appendix C shows the data for nurses and compare them with the data for physicians 
as reported in Andreassen et al. (2013). We only use observations of married individuals who did 
not change their marital status during the observation period. Table C.1 in Appendix C shows the 
sample selection. The final sample has 28,578 married nurses. 
 
We have coded the data so that we ended up with 10 different sectors of work described above 
(including not working). Table C.2 gives the distribution of physicians and nurses across sectors. 
Most nurses work in hospitals and primary care. Among working nurses, 59 percent work part-time 
in 1999, while only 31 percent of working physicians work part time. 
 
Our data only included hours worked per year, so weekly hours are calculated by dividing 
hours worked in a year by 48 (weeks in a year minus vacation). Table C.3 shows the number of 
hours worked in the different sectors. Working hours for full time jobs are longer in the private 
sector compared to the public sector, while working hours for part time jobs are longer in the public 
sectors. Table C.4 reports also the distribution between short part-time and long-part time for 
nurses. 
 
Table C.5 shows the mean of the explanatory variables for married physicians and married 
registered nurses. Women constitute around 27 per cent of physicians and 95 per cent of nurses. 
The average age of nurses increases from 43 in 1997 to 45 in 1999. Also the average age of 
physicians increases in the same period. 13 percent of nurses are married with somebody in the 
health sector and 43 percent of physicians are married with somebody in the health sector. The 
percentage of nurses with an external job decreases from 7 percent in 1997 to 6 percent in 1999. For 
physicians, the percentages changes from 10 to 8 percent. 
 
Our model is based on the assumption that we can simulate the different levels of consumption 
and leisure which could be achieved by each individual in each sector if they chose to work there. 
Our calculations are based on estimated wage equations done independently for the three years 
1997, 1998 and 1999. The resulting levels of possible consumption and leisure are reported in Table 
C.6 and C.7 respectively. For the states which are observed chosen by an individual we use 
observed leisure, while for other potential, but not chosen states, we use average leisure among 
those observed in the state. Consumption is determined by wage income, capital income, transfer 
8 
income and the income of the spouse. All income variables were deflated by the consumer price 
index. Leisure is expressed as a percentage of available time. Available time includes time over the 
week-ends and vacation time but excludes 12 hours per day of sleeping and personal care time. 
 
In Appendix D, Tables D.1-D.4, we report the observed transitions across states. Although 
“stayers” are dominating there are also a considerable amount of “movers”. 
 
In order to estimate the model of Section 2, we need to estimate the wage equations. Appendix 





In this section we report the results for the labor supply of nurses alongside with the results for 
physicians estimated by Andreassen et al (2013). The estimate of the utility function is given in 
Table 1 and the estimates of the rationing function, the availability of jobs, is given in Table 2 
below. 
(Table 1 and 2 approximately here) 
 
The exponents in the Box-Cox utility function are both less than 1 which implies that the utility 
function is strictly concave. For nurses, the part of the utility that is related to leisure is not 
significantly different from a log linear function. For both medical doctors and nurses, the marginal 
utility of consumption is declining in consumption. Its variation with age is shown in Figure 1. 
(Figure 1 approximately here) 
 
The marginal utility of consumption is a concave function of age with a peak around 40 year of 
age for nurses and 45 for medical doctors. For both nurses and physicians, the marginal utility is 
shifted upwards if the spouse also works in the health sectors. This implies that health workers 
married to health workers have stronger incentives to work longer hours in the health sector than 
other health workers. 
The impact of having children below the age of 7 on the leisure term is not significantly 
different from zero for physicians but positive for nurses. Thus nurses with small children have 
lesser incentives to work long hours compared to physicians, which may be due to the fact that most 
of the nurses are women while most physicians are men. As in most countries women takes more 
9 
care of small children than men. It is interesting to note that the impact of older children on the 
marginal utility of leisure is positive and similar for both nurses and physicians. 
The estimate of the habit persistence parameters implies that the young are more mobile than 
the old, given wages, taxes and other incentives. As seen on Figure 2 this is particular the case for 
medical doctors. 
(Figure 2 approximately here) 
 
Mobility as captured by the habit persistence parameters are declining with age, more strongly 
for physicians than for nurses, and with a weak tendency of increasing again when the health 
workers are approaching retirement age. 
How well the model fits data is illustrated on Figures 3 and 4. With a few exceptions, in 
particular for private hospitals where the observations are few, the model fits data pretty well. 
 
 




In Table 3 we report the impact of an overall wage increase in all years from 1997 to 1999 on 
labor supply in 1999. In Table 4 we report similar elasticities based on some selected 
characteristics. 
(Table 3 and 4 approximately here) 
 
We observe that the labor supply of both nurses and doctor are rather inelastic. An overall wage 
increase of 1 percent increases labor supply in terms of total hours of work in 1999 by only 0.03- 
0.04 percent. However an overall wage increase is predicted to have a stronger impact on the 
distribution of physicians and nurses across job types. An overall wage increase is predicted to shift 
in particular physicians to full time jobs in hospitals. 
Table 4 shows that the labor supply elasticities of physicians do not vary much according to 
either age or to their original state. On the other hand, the wage elasticities of nurses vary greatly, 
being higher if they are not working, than if they are working full or part-time. The elasticities for 
those not working are higher for nurses than for physicians. Having young children does not affect 
the labor supply of physicians (the coefficient is not significantly different from zero), but has a 
relatively strong effect on the wage elasticities of nurses. These results indicate that for nurses the 
work/not work decision is more important than for physicians (especially if they have young 
children), while income plays a greater role for physicians. 
6. Policy simulation 
 
In Table 5 we report the impact of change in taxation away from the current progressive tax 
system towards a flat tax of 28%. The change in taxation is implemented for the whole period 1997- 
1999. This change in taxation gives the medical doctors an incentive to shift their work from part 
time jobs to full time jobs, in particular to jobs in the private sector. The reason for this is that wage 
levels and wage dispersion is much higher in the private than in the public sector. By moving to the 
private sector and by increasing their working loads the medical doctor can keep more of their gross 
gain due to lower taxes. For nurses the impact of lower taxes is much weaker. Most of them have 
lower income in potential new jobs, even in the private sector, than physicians and therefore they 
don’t benefit that much from shifting jobs. Some of the nurses have so low potential income that the 
flat tax of 28% increases their taxes. Moreover, their spouses get higher disposable income and this 
also has a negative impact on their labor supply. We therefore find that some quit working. 
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We have estimated a discrete choice model with random terms where we allow for these terms 
to be correlated over time and jobs (habit persistence). Past options and not only the past optimal 
choices matter for the current choices. Given observed incentives we find that both nurses and in 
particular medical doctors are mobile when they are young, but there is a weak tendency of higher 
mobility again when physicians and nurses are approaching retirement age. 
Wage increases have a modest impact on labor supply. The overall elasticity for both 
physicians and nurses are close to zero. These low elasticities shadow to some extent for stronger 
responses, shifting labor away from part time jobs in the public and private sector towards full time 
jobs in the private sector. This latter result accords well with the fact that in recent years when the 
real wages in Norway have increased substantially there are more physicians and nurses working in 
private hospitals. The regulation of hours is more rigid in the public than in the private sector. 
Our results indicate that a reform that may help in increasing the labor supply of nurses is to 
remove some of the constraints related to the availability of full time jobs for nurses. 
A change in taxation away from the progressive tax system towards a flat tax of 28% gives 
the medical doctor an incentive to shift their job to private hospitals. The reason for this is that the 
wage level and dispersion is much higher in the private than in the public sector. With a lower and 
flat tax rate they can reap more of these private benefits. For nurses the impact is much more 
modest. Their potential wage when moving is not that much higher than in the public sector, at least 
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Table 1. Estimates of the utility function 
 
Variables Physicians Nurses Difference 




Constant -2.28** 0.823 -3.10** 0.4116 0.82 0.9201
Age, 1998 0.14** 0.0355 0.22** 0.0179 -0.07 0.0397
  -          
Age squared 0.0016** 0.0004 -0.0028** 0.0002 0.0012** 0.0004
Spouse in health sector 0.15** 0.0541 0.10* 0.0512 0.05 0.0745
More than one job 0.22** 0.0526 0.10** 0.0338 0.12* 0.0626
Last year of University (turnus) 8 -0.71** 0.1933 - -    
Exponent λ 0.31** 0.0651 0.55** 0.0335 -0.24** 0.0732
Leisure 
 
Constant 5.07** 0.3906 3.75** 0.2324 1.32** 0.4545
No. of children less than 7 yrs 0.09 0.096 1.04** 0.0644 -0.95** 0.1156
No. of children 7-18 yrs 0.24** 0.0729 0.20** 0.0441 0.04 0.0852
Female 0.10 0.1626 1.08** 0.1794 -0.98** 0.2421
Exponent γ 0.42* 0.1799 -0.08 0.0875 0.51* 0.2001
Habit persistence 
 
Constant 13.76** 1.4822 4.85** 0.467 8.91** 1.554
Age, 1998 -0.49** 0.0593 -0.13** 0.0202 -0.36** 0.0627
Age squared 0.0046** 0.0006 0.0013** 0.0002 0.0033** 0.0006
 
No. of observations 6,564 28,578 
Log-likelihood -10,993.1 -38,088.1 




















8  It is mandatory for all physicians to work their final year of studying medicine as an apprentice doctor in a given, 
often rural, location. 
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1. Public sector, long part time 




2 .Public hospital, full time 0.25** 0.0024 6.03** 0.0427 
3. Private hospital, long part-time     3.91** 0.1486 
4. Private hospital, full time 
5. Public health care, long part- 
time 






6. Public health care, full time 
7. Private health care, long part- 
time 






8. Private health care, full time 0.17** 0.0060 6.26** 0.1398 
9. Other, long part-time     4.09** 0.0486 




Log-likelihood -10,993.1   -38,088.1  
* Statistically significant at 5% level,  ** Statistically significant at 1% level 
The rationing of part-time in the case of nurses concerns long part-time 
 
 
Table 3. Labor supply elasticities in 1999 based on the observed population. Percent change in 
number of worker and hours when wages increase by 1% in all years 1997-1999. 
 
Sector Physicians Nurses 
 





1. Public sector, part time 0.02 0.00 
2 .Public hospital, full time 0.03 0.03 
3. Private hospital, part-time 0.04 0.03 
4. Private hospital, full time 0.26 0.14 
5. Public health care, part-time -0.03 0.00 
6. Public health care, full time 0.06 0.04 
7. Private health care, part-time -0.03 0.00 
8. Private health care, full time 0.14 0.10 
9. Other 0.04 0.04 




Table 4. Labour supply elasticities in 1999 based on selected combinations of observed 
characteristics. Per cent change in hours in 1999 when wages increase by 1% in all years 
1997-1999. Females with a husband who does not work in the health sector. 
 
 
30 years of age 40 years of age 50 years of age 
  Physicians Nurses   Physicians Nurses   Physicians Nurses   
 
Not working in 1997 
 
No children 18 or younger 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.11
2 young children (0-6 years) 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.10 0.14
 




No children 18 or younger 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.01
2 young children (0-6 years) 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.01
 




No children 18 or younger 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.01
2 young children (0-6 years) 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.03
 
 
Table 5. Change in labor supply with the introduction of a flat tax. Percent change in number 
of worker and hours when a flat tax of 28% is implemented for the whole period 1997-1999. 
 
Sector Physicians Nurses 
 





1. Public sector, part time -1.73 -0.27 
2 .Public hospital, full time 0.79 0.32 
3. Private hospital, part-time -2.84 -0.81 
4. Private hospital, full time 11.43 1.77 
5. Public health care, part-time -2.17 -0.25 
6. Public health care, full time 1.98 0.35 
7. Private health care, part-time -3.49 -0.89 
8. Private health care, full time 5.05 1.04 
9. Other, part- and full time -0.54 -0.06 
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Appendix A. Tax functions 
 













































Appendix B. Estimation procedures 
 
The wage equations 
In order to estimate the model we need estimates of the wage equations. Log wage is 
assumed to depend on observed covariates (the Z-vector to be defined below) and a random term. 
The random term consist of two parts; one that is distributed across job types, individuals and time, 
and one that is distributed only across individuals. The latter random component accounts for 







log Wint  Zntit int 
int  eint it n 
n   L( 0,1) 
eint  it eint ,where eint   L( 0,1) 
 
L(0,1) is the standard logistic distribution 
We then get 
( A.2 ) log Wint  Zntit iteint it n ; i 1,2,,,9 
 
The correlations in wages across jobs are given by: 
 
cov( int ,jnt  ) E int jnt it jt 
( A.3 ) corr(  , )  it jt 
int jnt 2  2 2  2 
it it jt jt 
 
The wage equations are estimated separately, but we account for selection in the following way. 
We estimate a set of coefficients for every year. Hence we are using 3 (1997-1999) cross-section 
datasets to estimate the coefficients. In the estimation of the wage equation we use a larger data set. 
Unmarried physicians and nurses are included and the justification is that there are no reasons to 
expect wages to differ with respect to marital status. The coefficients vary across the 9 job types 
and over time. The vector of the explanatory variables Znt is (1, age, gender, centrality index 
education) 
Let φ be the density for the normalized (0,1) logistic density distribution. And let 
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Lt  w ( log wjnt  Zntjt  jt n jt log Pjnt  ) 
and 





( A.3 ) ˆ (.) 1 ( log wjnt  Zntjt  jt n jt log Pjnt  )  
and 
S  1 
 
Nt       9 
jt 
logLˆ 
 log log 
w 
log ˆ (.) 
t 
n1  j 1 
jt jnt 
 
The latter logLˆ is used to estimate coefficients in the wage equations. Here s is a random draw 
 
for each individual from a standard logistic distribution, number of draws are S=20. Pjnt is a 
standard multinomial logit probability (for doctor or nurse n, working in job type j at time t) used to 
capture selection effects, see Strøm and Wagenhals (1991) for an outline of selection effects in 




( A.4 ) 
Pjnt   v jnt 9 vknt 
k 0 
 
; j 0,1,2,,,9 
v jnt  ynt jt 
 
Here the vector ynt is (1,age,education, number of children above and below 6 years of age, 
dummy for married or cohabiting, dummy for married to a person working in the health sector or 
not, spouse income). Note that the coefficients, both in the wage equations and in the probabilities 
capturing selection effects, Pjnt, vary across alternatives and over time. Not working is among the 
alternatives in the probabilities. The estimates of the wage equations and the probabilities related to 
selection effects, as well as summary statistics, are given in Appendix C. 
Estimation of the utility function and rationing of jobs 
To proceed with the estimation of the utility function we first have to calculate the disposable 
income function, here called consumption, in each of the 10 states. For all states, irrespective of the 
fact that we have observed the wage in the job chosen by the agent, we use the wage equation, 
including all terms, also the error terms. For the working states we have done the following: 
t 
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Cint = ft (wint hjnt +Inst )+Int , i=1,2,,9 
( A.5 )  ft (wint hint +Inst  )=wint hint +Inst  T( wint hint +Inst  ) 










1 S R    

int 
 t nt    it it   int i   n int nst 
(A.6) C  = f 
SR s=1  r=1 
exp(Z    
es 





Here the coefficients in the wage equations are estimated from the previous step. s=1,2,,,S and 
r=1,2,,,R, are draws from the standard logistic distribution. We have used S=R=20. Instead of 
integrating out the error terms in the wage equations in the disposable income function, we could 
have integrated them out in the final likelihood function. Due to the complexity of the model we 
have chosen to do the former. Due to the random variables in the wage equations which are present 
in the transition probabilities, the assumption of IIA is avoided. 
The parameters of the utility function, including the habit persistence parameter ρ, are estimated 
in a maximum likelihood approach where the likelihood depends on the transition probabilities. The 
initial year, t0, is 1997, and the years where transitions can take place are 1998 and 1999. Let the 
vector of coefficients to be estimated be π. 
Suppressing the observed variables and the random variables that are integrated out, the 




( A.7 ) Qijnt  Qijnt ( ) 
 
The likelihood for our sample is: 
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y( A.8 ) L  1999    Nt 9 9 Q   ( ) i( t1 ), j( t ),n  ijnt 
t 1997  n1 i1 j 1 
yi( t1 ), j( t ),n 1 if n transit from state i in year t 1 to state j in year t 
otherwise 
yi( t1 ), j( t ),n 0 
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Appendix C. Data 
 
In this appendix the data and estimates for physicians are copied from Andreassen et al (2013). 
 












Dropped if not a doctor or nurse in 1997, 1998 or 1999 2,172 9,458









1997  1998  1999  1997  1998  1999 
    
0. Not working  334  377  394  1,051  1,423  1,717 
1. Public hospital, part‐time  857  792  862  7,404  7,595  7,786 
2.  “  “  full time  2,750  2,828  2,786  4,729  4,870  4,609 
3. Private hospital, part‐time  39  34  39  194  226 246 
4.  “  “  full time  77  86  92  112  112 117 
5. Public health care, part‐time  785  830  912  7,555  7,376  7,428 
6.  “  “  full time  402  355  318  3,549  3,517  3,459 
7. Private health care, part‐time  118  135  131  242  242 293 
8.  “  “  full time  96  110  121  146  179 204 
9.Other  1,106  1,017  909  3,596  3,038  2,719 



















2.  “  “  full time  40.0  39.9 39.3 39.9 39.9  39.2 
3. Private hospital, part‐time 19.1  20.2 18.5 18.7 18.9  18.7 
4.  “  “  full time  42.2  41.9 42.1 42.5 42.3  42.3 
5. Public health care, part‐time  16.7  15.7 15.6 21.4 21.1  20.9 
6.  “  “  full time  40.5  40.6 40.6 39.7 39.7  39.5 
7. Private health care, part‐time  14.6  13.2 13.9 19.0 18.3  18.4 
8.  “  “  full time  42.3  42.6 42.8 42.3 42.8  42.5 






  (less than 20 hours week)   20‐29 hours a week   
     1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999   
 
1. Public hospital, part‐time  21.0  23.2  25.0  79.0  76.8  75.0 
3. Private hospital, part‐time 52.1  42.5 44.3 47.9 57.5  55.7 
5. Public health care, part‐time  24.3  25.8 27.3 75.7 74.2  72.7 
7. Private health care, part‐time  51.7  49.6 49.1 48.3 50.4  50.9 




      Physicians       Nurses   















Age  45 46 47 43 44  45
Age squared  2,108 2,199 2,292 1,902 1,988  2,077
No. children younger than 7 years  0.68 0.58 0.49 0.61 0.52  0.44
No. children 7‐18 years of age 1.01 1.03 1.04 0.95 0.97  0.98
Spouse working in health sector  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.13 0.13  0.13
Has a side job  0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06  0.06
Works “turnus” (internship)9  0.03  0.01  0.00    ‐  ‐  ‐ 






  1997 1998 1999  1997 1998 1999   
 
0. Not working  234,008  208,758  230,922  154,233  207,313  228,687 
1. Public hospital, part‐time 376,104 347,365 366,002 247,612 308,821  330,624 
2.  “  “  full time  457,517 444,162 467,571 310,696 379,912  408,697 
3. Private hospital, part‐time 375,572 370,105 370,429 253,758 308,453  337,562 
4.  “  “  full time  514,895 497,835 556,823 315,138 382,632  415,413 
5. Public health care, part‐time  334,460 308,563 332,590 245,368 306,601  330,230 
6.  “  “  “   full time 448,288 439,211 467,161 310,529 379,140  407,684 
7. Private health care, part‐time  325,550 304,015 330,991 247,038 305,830  326,544 
8.  “  “  “   full time 446,135 446,595 497,167 309,615 373,088  407,585 






9  It is mandatory for all physicians to work their final year of studying medicine as an apprentice doctor in a given, 






  1997 1998 1999  1997 1998 1999   
 
0. Not working  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
1. Public hospital, part‐time 78.1% 79.1% 79.4% 75.9% 76.4%  76.9% 
2.  “  “  full time  56.2% 56.2% 56.9% 56.3% 56.3%  57.0% 
3. Private hospital, part‐time 79.1% 77.9% 79.8% 79.5% 79.3%  79.5% 
4.  “  “  full time  53.7% 54.1% 53.9% 53.4% 53.7%  53.6% 
5. Public health care, part‐time  81.7% 82.9% 82.9% 76.5% 76.7%  77.0% 
6.  “  “  “   full time 55.6% 55.5% 55.5% 56.5% 56.5%  56.7% 
7. Private health care, part‐time  84.0% 85.6% 84.7% 79.2% 79.9%  79.8% 
8.  “  “  “   full time 53.7% 53.3% 53.1% 53.7% 53.1%  53.4% 
9. Other  68.0% 70.7% 71.3% 68.4% 69.5%  69.7% 
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Appendix D. Observed transition rates for nurses, transition rates for physicians are 
given in Andreassen et al (2013) 
 
Table. D.1 Transitions of married nurses from 1997 to 1998. Number of individuals.   
  Hospitals   Primary care   
 
  Not  Public  Private  Public  Private  Other   







































1. Publ. hospitals, part time  245  5,646  878  17  11  270  61  29  11  236  7,404 
2. Publ. hospitals, full time  39  922  3,552  9  4  53  52  3  6  89  4,729 
3. Priv. hospitals, part time  9  12  4  124  16  18  5  2  0  4  194 
4. Priv. hospitals, full time  3  4  4  32  59  4  2  1  1  2  112 
5. Publ. primary care, part time  295  237  91  24  12  5,846  721  28  14  287  7,555 
6. Publ. primary care, full time 47  59  40  4  3  762  2,512  5  6  111  3,549 
7. Priv. primary care, part time  11  21  10  5  1  26  5  121  30  12  242 
8. Priv. primary care, full time 4  2  5  0  2  4  4  23  100  2  146 
9. Other  146  568  249  5  4  267  148  22  9  2,178  3,596 





Table. D.2 Transitions of married nurses from 1998 to 1999. Number of individuals.   
  Hospitals   Primary care   
 





































1. Publ. hospitals, part time  296  5,852  729  23  7  327  78  35  11  237  7,595 
2. Publ. hospitals, full time  45  1,043  3,506  6  8  81  74  6  14  87  4,870 
3. Priv. hospitals, part time  5  22  6  140  16  19  10  0  0  8  226 
4. Priv. hospitals, full time  1  2  6  27  71  3  1  0  1  0  112 
5. Publ. primary care, part time  310  297  91  26  5  5,685  652  37  17  256  7,376 
6. Publ. primary care, full time 45  50  93  7  5  764  2,433  7  16  97  3,517 
7. Priv. primary care, part time  9  19  2  1  0  30  9  137  18  17  242 
8. Priv. primary care, full time 1  3  4  0  0  6  8  35  118  4  179 
9. Other  133  365  137  7  2  327  182  23  7  1,855  3,038 







Table. D.3 Transitions of married nurses from 1997 to 1998.   
  Hospitals   Primary care   
 





































1. Publ. hospitals, part time  0.03  0.76 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.03 1.00
2. Publ. hospitals, full time  0.01  0.20 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.02 1.00
3. Priv. hospitals, part time  0.05  0.06 0.02 0.64 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.01  0.00  0.02 1.00
4. Priv. hospitals, full time  0.03  0.04 0.04 0.29 0.53 0.04 0.02 0.01  0.01  0.02 1.00
5. Publ. primary care, part time  0.04  0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.10 0.00  0.00  0.04 1.00
6. Publ. primary care, full time 0.01  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.71 0.00  0.00  0.03 1.00
7. Priv. primary care, part time  0.05  0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.50  0.12  0.05 1.00
8. Priv. primary care, full time 0.03  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.16  0.68  0.01 1.00





Table. D.4 Transitions of married nurses from 1998 to 1999.   
  Hospitals   Primary care   
 





































1. Publ. hospitals, part time  0.04  0.77 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.03 1.00
2. Publ. hospitals, full time  0.01  0.21 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00  0.00  0.02 1.00
3. Priv. hospitals, part time  0.02  0.10 0.03 0.62 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.00  0.00  0.04 1.00
4. Priv. hospitals, full time  0.01  0.02 0.05 0.24 0.63 0.03 0.01 0.00  0.01  0.00 1.00
5. Publ. primary care, part time  0.04  0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.09 0.01  0.00  0.03 1.00
6. Publ. primary care, full time 0.01  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.69 0.00  0.00  0.03 1.00
7. Priv. primary care, part time  0.04  0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.57  0.07  0.07 1.00
8. Priv. primary care, full time 0.01  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.20  0.66  0.02 1.00
9. Other  0.04  0.12 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.01  0.00  0.61 1.00
Note: The column to the left gives the states in 1998. Bold value indicates that the individual does not change state. 
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Appendix E. Wage equations and selection effects for nurses, for physicians see 
Andreassen et al (2013). 
We estimate wage equations for all individuals for the three years 1997, 1998 and 1999. The 
wage equations for physicians are documented in Andreassen et al (2013). The wage equations for 
nurses are documented below. We take sample selection into account by including the predicted 
choice probabilities, Pr1 – Pr9, as explanatory variables in the wage equations. These probabilities 
were the predictions resulting from a simple multinomial logit estimation of sector choice. We   
show the mean of the explanatory variables used in the estimation of the choice probabilities in 
Table E.1. The estimates of the choice probabilities are given in Table E.2 and the resulting average 
predicted probabilities are given in Tables E.3, along with the means of the other variables used in 
the wage equations. The logit estimations were done on all nurses in a given year, while the wage 
equations were estimated on all working nurses with observations of wage income. The estimates of 
the wage equations are given in Table E.5. The wage equations for all nine work sectors have been 
estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood, allowing for correlation between the different 
wages. The parameters σ1 to σ9 are the variance parameters mentioned in the main paper, and the 
parameters κ1 to κ9 are the parameters allowing for correlation between sectors. As can be seen   
from the tables these correlation factors are not found to be significant, indicating that there is not 
much residual correlation between the different wages after correcting for the other explanatory 
variables. In general being a woman reduces wages, while wages increase with age. Table E.6 
shows the mean and predicted hourly wages for nurses and derived from predictions using the 
estimated wage equations reported above. Table E.7 shows the predicted wages for physicians   
based on the wage equations documented in Andreassen et. al. (2013). The wages for doctors are 





  1997  1998  1999
Female  0.93  0.93  0.92
Birthyear  1940 1940 1941
Married  0.70 0.66 0.66
No. children younger than 7 years  0.60 0.52 0.43
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  0.72 0.72 0.71
Less than 16 years of education  0.83 0.81 0.75
16 or more years of education 0.14 0.16 0.21
Missing education  0.03 0.04 0.04
Spouse working in health sector  0.09 0.09 0.09
Income of spouse, NOK  76,689 79,613 83,498






  1997 1998 1999   
Coeff.    Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff.    Std. Err.
       
Female  ‐0.14    0.1342  ‐0.06  0.1173  ‐0.12    0.0996 
Birthyear  ‐0.07  ***  0.0031  ‐0.08  ***  0.0027  ‐0.09  ***  0.0023 
Married  0.46  ***  0.0840  0.33  ***  0.0624  0.45  ***  0.0574 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.41  ***  0.0340  ‐0.44  ***  0.0313  ‐0.46  ***  0.0308 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.01    0.0313  0.18  ***  0.0283  0.28  ***  0.0273 
16 or more years of education  0.22  **  0.0922  0.12  0.0717  0.27  ***  0.0603 
Missing education  ‐0.98  ***  0.1002  ‐1.28  ***  0.0847  ‐1.81  ***  0.0724 
Spouse working in health sector  0.39  ***  0.1110  0.40  ***  0.0952  0.42  ***  0.0888 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐0.16    0.4830  ‐0.10  0.2480  ‐0.16    0.2150 
Constant  135.1  *** 6.0983 153.0 *** 5.1505 168.0  ***  4.5298
2. Public hospital, fulltime         
Female  ‐1.04  ***  0.1324  ‐1.17  ***  0.1147  ‐1.04  ***  0.0982 
Birthyear  ‐0.06  ***  0.0032  ‐0.07  ***  0.0027  ‐0.07  ***  0.0024 
Married  0.49  ***  0.0880  0.04  0.0649  0.17  ***  0.0602 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.90  ***  0.0364  ‐1.02  ***  0.0345  ‐1.12  ***  0.0353 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.33  ***  0.0329  ‐0.15  ***  0.0298  ‐0.01    0.0288 
16 or more years of education  0.90  ***  0.0918  0.64  ***  0.0716  0.32  ***  0.0616 
Missing education  ‐1.40  ***  0.1087  ‐1.69  ***  0.0932  ‐1.96  ***  0.0779 
Spouse working in health sector  0.75  ***  0.1127  0.67  ***  0.0967  0.77  ***  0.0903 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐3.48  ***  0.5320  0.06  0.2580  ‐0.16    0.2270 
Constant  122.1  *** 6.1379 144.2 *** 5.2216 146.1  ***  4.6024
3. Private hospital, part time         
Female  ‐0.24    0.2705  ‐0.03  0.2713  ‐0.14    0.2318 
Birthyear  ‐0.08  ***  0.0076  ‐0.10  ***  0.0070  ‐0.09  ***  0.0061 
Married  0.48  **  0.2033  0.73  ***  0.1640  0.80  ***  0.1529 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.60  ***  0.0796  ‐0.67  ***  0.0779  ‐0.67  ***  0.0794 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.21  ***  0.0744  ‐0.01  0.0654  0.12    0.0603 
16 or more years of education  0.41  **  0.1884  0.24  0.1628  0.34  ***  0.1285 
Missing education  ‐1.86  ***  0.4239  ‐1.91  ***  0.3672  ‐2.33  ***  0.3446 
Spouse working in health sector  0.48  **  0.2288  0.38  0.2105  0.36    0.2001 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐0.31    1.1800  0.07  0.6080  ‐0.16    0.5380 
Constant  154.4  *** 14.7357 196.1 *** 13.4715 182.4  ***  11.8952
4. Private hospital, fulltime         
Female  ‐0.73  ***  0.2622  ‐0.92  ***  0.2436  ‐0.76  ***  0.2589 
Birthyear  ‐0.09  ***  0.0086  ‐0.09  ***  0.0081  ‐0.08  ***  0.0083 
Married  0.66  **  0.2575  0.31  0.2066  0.41  *  0.2165 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.84  ***  0.0967  ‐1.03  ***  0.1127  ‐0.95  ***  0.1316 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.59  ***  0.1071  ‐0.24  ***  0.0922  0.07    0.0858 
16 or more years of education  0.63  ***  0.2126  0.72  ***  0.1766  0.49  ***  0.1697 
Missing education  ‐1.90  ***  0.4644  ‐2.36  ***  0.5132  ‐2.48  ***  0.5131 
Spouse working in health sector  0.47    0.2848  0.64  0.2536  0.65    0.2559 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐2.50    1.7800  ‐1.19  0.9210  0.15    0.7550 
Constant  177.4  *** 16.6418 173.5 *** 15.6853 147.2  ***  16.0066
5. Public health care, part time         
Female  0.17    0.1386  0.02  0.1204  0.16    0.1040 
Birthyear  ‐0.03  ***  0.0031  ‐0.05  ***  0.0027  ‐0.06  ***  0.0023 
Married  1.05  ***  0.0855  0.51  ***  0.0632  0.60  ***  0.0580 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.21  ***  0.0345  ‐0.25  ***  0.0317  ‐0.26  ***  0.0311 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  0.12  ***  0.0313  0.26  ***  0.0284  0.35  ***  0.0274 
16 or more years of education  0.05    0.0932  ‐0.11  0.0731  0.15  **  0.0612 
Missing education  ‐1.08  ***  0.1046  ‐1.32  ***  0.0885  ‐1.71  ***  0.0748 
Spouse working in health sector  0.05    0.1127  0.10  0.0969  0.12    0.0907 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐3.69  ***  0.5030  ‐0.13  0.2470  ‐0.35    0.2160 



































Age  ‐0.05  ***  0.0033  ‐0.06  ***  0.0029  ‐0.06  ***  0.0026 
Married  1.22  ***  0.0935  0.34  ***  0.0694  0.48  ***  0.0646 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.75  ***  0.0389  ‐0.78  ***  0.0368  ‐0.84  ***  0.0373 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.12  ***  0.0337  0.08  ***  0.0306  0.22  ***  0.0294 
16 or more years of education  0.77  ***  0.0945  0.59  ***  0.0744  0.38  ***  0.0644 
Missing education  ‐1.11  ***  0.1186  ‐1.47  ***  0.1056  ‐1.71  ***  0.0883 
Spouse working in health sector  0.37  ***  0.1172  0.38  ***  0.1013  0.46  ***  0.0947 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐5.97  ***  0.5730  0.08  0.2680  ‐0.02    0.2350 
Constant  90.7  *** 6.4986 111.4 *** 5.5906  119.3  ***  4.9660
7. Private health care, part time         
Female  ‐0.69  ***  0.2334  ‐0.33  0.2314  ‐0.45  **  0.1954 
Age  ‐0.05  ***  0.0073  ‐0.06  ***  0.0064  ‐0.06  ***  0.0057 
Married  0.35  *  0.1901  0.11  0.1533  0.33  **  0.1377 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.46  ***  0.0777  ‐0.58  ***  0.0788  ‐0.42  ***  0.0733 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.02    0.0656  0.23  ***  0.0579  0.37  ***  0.0523 
16 or more years of education  0.11    0.1899  ‐0.10  0.1684  0.06    0.1301 
Missing education  ‐1.71  ***  0.3938  ‐1.60  ***  0.3039  ‐1.98  ***  0.2706 
Spouse working in health sector  0.59  ***  0.2015  0.85  ***  0.1786  0.63  ***  0.1697 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  0.74    0.9870  0.03  0.5920  ‐0.60    0.5180 
Constant  105.2  *** 14.1402 120.2 *** 12.4772  109.9  ***  11.0013
8. Private health care, fulltime         
Female  ‐0.68  **  0.2916  ‐0.90  ***  0.2500  ‐0.80  ***  0.2178 
Age  ‐0.06  ***  0.0092  ‐0.07  ***  0.0083  ‐0.06  ***  0.0072 
Married  0.85  ***  0.2566  0.88  ***  0.2056  0.61  ***  0.1844 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.99  ***  0.1213  ‐0.77  ***  0.1068  ‐0.72  ***  0.1052 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.28  ***  0.0886  0.07  0.0732  0.25  ***  0.0664 
16 or more years of education  0.91  ***  0.1930  0.80  ***  0.1605  0.52  ***  0.1450 
Missing education  ‐1.43  ***  0.4663  ‐1.98  ***  0.5128  ‐2.11  ***  0.3908 
Spouse working in health sector  0.74  ***  0.2445  0.44  0.2253  0.84  ***  0.1944 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐0.80    1.3700  ‐0.16  0.6930  0.17    0.5880 
Constant  124.0  *** 17.7236 133.2 *** 16.0365  118.0  ***  13.9972
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime 
Female  ‐0.69  ***  0.1381  ‐0.79  ***  0.1210  ‐0.73  ***  0.1049 
Age  ‐0.06  ***  0.0034  ‐0.08  ***  0.0030  ‐0.08  ***  0.0027 
Married  0.59  ***  0.0905  0.37  ***  0.0702  0.44  ***  0.0665 
No. children younger than 7 years  ‐0.49  ***  0.0370  ‐0.49  ***  0.0350  ‐0.51  ***  0.0355 
No. children 7  to 18 years of age  ‐0.02    0.0332  0.18  ***  0.0307  0.29  ***  0.0299 
16 or more years of education  0.68  ***  0.0946  0.62  ***  0.0755  0.65  ***  0.0649 
Missing education  ‐1.13  ***  0.1182  ‐1.27  ***  0.1047  ‐1.79  ***  0.0980 
Spouse working in health sector  ‐0.07    0.1196  0.05  0.1053  0.31  ***  0.0983 
Income of spouse (1/1,000,000)  ‐0.18    0.5140  0.08  0.2740  ‐0.08    0.2460 
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  1997 1998 1999   
 
Female  0.93 0.92 0.92
Birthyear  1940 1940 1940
Less than 16 years of education  0.83 0.81 0.75
16 or more years of education  0.14 0.16 0.22
Missing education  0.03 0.03 0.03
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  0.11 0.11 0.11
Less central and central municipalities  0.39 0.39 0.38
Especially central municipalities  0.50 0.50 0.51
Probability of working at job type 1  0.255  0.263  0.273 
Probability of working at job type 2  0.174 0.176 0.167
Probability of working at job type 3  0.007 0.008 0.008
Probability of working at job type 4  0.004 0.004 0.004
Probability of working at job type 5  0.216 0.215 0.221
Probability of working at job type 6  0.111 0.112 0.110
Probability of working at job type 7  0.008 0.008 0.010
Probability of working at job type 8  0.004 0.005 0.006
Probability of working at job type 9  0.121 0.105 0.096






















Female  ‐0.042 *** 0.0089 ‐0.085 *** 0.0102 ‐0.098  ***  0.0063
Age  0.004 *** 0.0003 0.006 *** 0.0003 0.007  ***  0.0002
16 or more years of education 0.049 *** 0.0055 0.078 *** 0.0049 0.036  ***  0.0027
Missing education  0.003 0.0086 0.036 *** 0.0083 0.097  ***  0.0070
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.035 *** 0.0068 ‐0.026 *** 0.0066 ‐0.014  ***  0.0047
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.032 *** 0.0032 ‐0.029 *** 0.0030 ‐0.024  ***  0.0022
Ln(Pr1)  0.036 *** 0.0113 0.102 *** 0.0134 0.171  ***  0.0103
Constant  ‐3.138 *** 0.4831 ‐5.789 *** 0.4746 ‐8.793  ***  0.3805
σ1  0.107 *** 0.0009 0.104 *** 0.0008 0.077  ***  0.0006
2. Public hospital fulltime       
Female  ‐0.033 *** 0.0034 ‐0.032 *** 0.0039 ‐0.039  ***  0.0032
Age  0.005 *** 0.0001 0.005 *** 0.0001 0.006  ***  0.0001
16 or more years of education 0.050 *** 0.0028 0.056 *** 0.0031 0.048  ***  0.0024
Missing education  ‐0.021 *** 0.0062 ‐0.036 *** 0.0073 ‐0.002    0.0056
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.007 0.0048 ‐0.001 0.0055 ‐0.024  ***  0.0049
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.018 *** 0.0022 ‐0.008 *** 0.0026 ‐0.030  ***  0.0021
Ln(Pr2)  ‐0.010 *** 0.0028 ‐0.001 0.0033 ‐0.025  ***  0.0027
Constant  ‐4.349 *** 0.2085 ‐5.523 *** 0.2344 ‐6.360  ***  0.1918
σ2  0.060 *** 0.0006 0.072 *** 0.0006 0.060  ***  0.0005
3. Private hospital part time       
Female  0.048 0.0861 0.162 * 0.0888 0.005    0.0751
Age  ‐0.003 0.0029 ‐0.003 0.0027 0.003    0.0021
16 or more years of education 0.153 *** 0.0567 0.123 ** 0.0480 ‐0.005    0.0378
Missing education  ‐0.332 ** 0.1346 ‐0.080 0.1174 0.031    0.1367
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.109 0.0789 0.085 0.0829 ‐0.028    0.0664
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.024 0.0444 ‐0.087 ** 0.0397 0.003    0.0430
Ln(Pr3)  ‐0.134 0.0983 ‐0.137 * 0.0835 ‐0.102    0.0892
Constant  10.367 ** 5.1329 10.559 ** 4.8613 ‐1.508    3.6956σ3  0.193 *** 0.0094 0.183 *** 0.0080 0.193  ***  0.0079
4. Private hospital fulltime       
Female  ‐0.099 *** 0.0321 ‐0.077 ** 0.0311 ‐0.113  ***  0.0425
Age  0.006 *** 0.0013 0.006 *** 0.0011 0.003  ***  0.0012
16 or more years of education 0.010 0.0274 ‐0.051 ** 0.0252 ‐0.015    0.0277
Missing education  ‐0.015 0.0632 ‐0.071 0.0866 0.060    0.1113
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.074 0.0639 ‐0.032 0.0622 ‐0.017    0.0540
Less central and central municipalities  0.026 0.0292 0.003 0.0281 ‐0.028    0.0335
Ln(Pr4)  0.035 0.0233 0.062 ** 0.0262 0.052    0.0490
Constant  ‐6.745 *** 2.4493 ‐5.818 *** 2.0685 ‐0.968    2.2885σ4  0.081 *** 0.0045 0.084 *** 0.0047 0.100  ***  0.0060
5. Public health care part time       
Female  ‐0.034 *** 0.0088 ‐0.042 *** 0.0086 ‐0.042  ***  0.0069
Age  0.001 *** 0.0001 0.002 *** 0.0001 0.002  ***  0.0001
16 or more years of education 0.020 *** 0.0049 0.038 *** 0.0049 0.016  ***  0.0032
Missing education  ‐0.001 0.0080 0.009 0.0083 0.039  ***  0.0068
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.013 *** 0.0037 ‐0.021 *** 0.0038 ‐0.017  ***  0.0031
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.016 *** 0.0030 ‐0.025 *** 0.0030 ‐0.017  ***  0.0024
Ln( Pr5)  0.015 *** 0.0048 0.020 *** 0.0055 0.032  ***  0.0046
Constant  2.143 *** 0.2612 1.675 *** 0.2631 1.829  ***  0.2067
























Female  ‐0.013 *** 0.0047 ‐0.011 ** 0.0050  ‐0.013  *** 0.0042
Age  0.002 *** 0.0002 0.002 *** 0.0002  0.002  *** 0.0001
16 or more years of education 0.015 *** 0.0036 0.025 *** 0.0038  0.022  *** 0.0026
Missing education  0.007 0.0068 ‐0.007 0.0075  0.001    0.0056
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.002 0.0033 ‐0.005 0.0033  ‐0.021  *** 0.0028
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.009 *** 0.0028 ‐0.010 *** 0.0028  ‐0.024  *** 0.0024
Ln(Pr6)  0.004 0.0058 0.007 0.0082  0.010    0.0063
Constant  1.346 *** 0.3292 1.387 *** 0.3674  1.748  *** 0.2937
σ6  0.056 *** 0.0007 0.058 *** 0.0007  0.050  *** 0.0006
7. Private health care part time      
Female  ‐0.110 0.0816 ‐0.024 0.0781  ‐0.093    0.0585
Age  ‐0.003 0.0021 0.001 0.0020  0.000    0.0017
16 or more years of education ‐0.014 0.0786 ‐0.007 0.0637  ‐0.033    0.0498
Missing education  ‐0.257 0.1578 ‐0.106 0.1115  0.020    0.0995
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.183 ** 0.0813 ‐0.186 ** 0.0768  ‐0.201  *** 0.0620
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.089 * 0.0459 ‐0.075 * 0.0452  ‐0.121  *** 0.0373
Ln(Pr7)  ‐0.111 0.0969 ‐0.067 0.0887  0.018    0.0881
Constant  11.041 *** 4.1361 3.296 3.9584  5.404    3.5252σ7  0.230 *** 0.0102 0.239 *** 0.0102  0.220  *** 0.0085
8. Private health care fulltime       
Female  ‐0.146 *** 0.0434 ‐0.162 *** 0.0465  ‐0.102  **  0.0415
Age  0.001 0.0014 0.002 0.0017  0.005  *** 0.0016
16 or more years of education 0.015 0.0309 0.051 0.0385  0.060  **  0.0273
Missing education  0.072 0.0862 0.094 0.1062  ‐0.115    0.0883
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.037 0.0477 ‐0.111 ** 0.0499  ‐0.061    0.0426
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.076 *** 0.0296 ‐0.066 ** 0.0325  ‐0.073  *** 0.0255
Ln(Pr8)  0.061 0.0374 0.015 0.0510  ‐0.048    0.0512
Constant  4.203 2.8733 1.867 3.4974  ‐5.876  *  3.2886
σ8  0.101 *** 0.0060 0.126 *** 0.0068  0.111  *** 0.0055
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime      
Female  ‐0.067 *** 0.0080 ‐0.044 *** 0.0084  ‐0.035  *** 0.0083
Age  0.004 *** 0.0002 0.005 *** 0.0003  0.006  *** 0.0003
16 or more years of education 0.030 *** 0.0058 0.007 0.0079  ‐0.037  *** 0.0083
Missing education  ‐0.028 ** 0.0113 ‐0.008 0.0116  0.040  *** 0.0125
Least central municipalities (kommuner)  ‐0.006 0.0071 ‐0.004 0.0074  ‐0.011  *  0.0064
Less central and central municipalities  ‐0.022 *** 0.0041 ‐0.015 *** 0.0047  ‐0.017  *** 0.0043
Ln(Pr9)  0.026 ** 0.0120 0.098 *** 0.0180  0.172  *** 0.0204
Constant  ‐1.999 *** 0.4042 ‐4.331 *** 0.5424  ‐6.097  *** 0.4995
σ9  0.091 *** 0.0011 0.098 *** 0.0012  0.087  *** 0.0011
κ1  0.000    0.0021  0.000    0.0020  0.000    0.0015 
κ 2  0.000 0.0020 0.000 0.0021  0.000    0.0021
κ 3  ‐0.033 0.0485 0.006 0.0438  ‐0.015    0.0359κ 4  0.004 0.0231 ‐0.001 0.0206  0.002    0.0228κ 5  0.000 0.0017 ‐0.001 0.0017  0.000    0.0014
κ 6  0.000 0.0018 0.000 0.0017  0.000    0.0016κ 7  0.012 0.0488 0.006 0.0390  ‐0.012    0.0305κ 8  0.006 0.0267 ‐0.005 0.0279  ‐0.007    0.0236
κ 9  ‐0.001   0.0027 0.000   0.0031  ‐0.001    0.0030
Number observations   42867  45330      48723 
Log likelihood     ‐188149.7      ‐204877.1      ‐211026.2 
*** statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval  ** statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval 
* statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval 







































































































































































































































































Predicted 113  8.23  113 116 10.25 115 122 9.61  121
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime 
Observed 119  47.15  115 128 53.78 122 129 48.70  125
Predicted 116  6.51  116 125 7.77 125 127 7.86  127
 

















































Predicted 186 33.23 180 182 30.74 176 174 27.15 168




















Predicted 180 16.94 179 185 16.44 184 181 14.88 180




















Predicted 187 18.69 189 212 59.92 203 191 24.34 187




















Predicted 223 27.00 223 226 24.76 227 242 30.55 238




















Predicted 158 11.55 158 166 12.84 166 165 13.34 164




















Predicted 166 10.51 166 174 15.90 173 175 11.89 175




















Predicted 164 10.35 163 186 20.11 185 183 17.82 182




















Predicted 157 20.71 151 172 27.81 172 191 35.47 184
9. Other sectors, both part time and fulltime 
Observed 168 67.00 166 167 59.88 169 169 62.31 169
Predicted 168 17.62 166 169 16.30 168 171 16.70 170
 
 
